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, 
/ 
/ THREE COMMENCEMENT 
ADDRESSES-1972 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. dur-
ing the past 2 weeks, I have been priv-
ileged to address the graduating class at 
Rocky Mountain College, Billings, Mont.; 
Foxcroft School, Middleburg, Va.; and 
Montana state University, Brozeman, 
Mont. 
In these addresses, I have tried to re-
late my thoughts and feelings in the field 
of foreign policy with what I hoped were 
the thoughts and feelings of these young 
men and women going out into the world. 
As an overall groUP, they will have much 
to sa,y, to do and, perhaps, to re-do and 
reenact. Whether or not I have succeeded 
in expressing my views to them in such 
a. manner as to give them something to 
think about today-and tomorrow remains 
to be seen. 
May I say that I was impressed with 
all three student bodies. I have great 
faith and confidence in this new genera-
tii:m. They can be expected, at least in 
part, to undo the errors and the mistakes 
of the past, even as they may make sOme 
of their own, as they build upon the reali-
ties of today and deal with the problems 
of tomorrow. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD the 
commencement address at Rocky Moun- · 
ta.in Colle~. Billings, Mont., on May 
29, 1972, entitled "China: A New Rela-
tionship"; the commencement address at 
the Foxcroft School, Middleburg, Va., 
June 9, 1972, entitled "China: Myths and 
Realities"; and the oommencement ad-
dress given at the Montana State Univer-
sity, in Bozeman, Mont., on June 10, 1972, 
entitled "Toward a Foreign Policy of 
Mutuality." 
There being no objection, the com-
mencement addresses were ordered to be 
printed in the RECORD, as follows: 
CHINA: A NEW RELATION9HD' 
I would like to share wlth you on this day 
which Is of great Importance to you some 
thoughts of world affairs. One aspect of this 
subject, In particular, begs !or your under-
standing and &ttentlon. That Is the relation-
ship between the United States•'and China. 
It Is uppermost In my mind, at this time, 
because I have only this month returned 
!rom & journey to Peking. The Impressions of 
the viSit to that capital and several other 
Chinese cities are still very vivid. So, too, are 
my d!Bcu.sslons with leaders of the People's 
Republic. 
Thl8 18 a notable year In U.S.-Chlna rela-
tions. The 1l.rst significant steps In 25 ye&rs 
have been talten towards & general revision 
of dealings with China. The Initiative was 
long overdue and, hence the backlog of un-
finl8hed business Is very heavy. 
Almoot a quarter of a century ago, we cut 
ourselves off, as a matter of deliberate policy, 
!rom all nonrutJ relations with the largest 
nation on e&rth. We did so bs' misreading or 
distorting, In an ofllclat sense, the lmpll.ca-
tlons of the Chinese revolution which 
brought & new government to Peking In 1949. 
Thereafter, we acted on the legal pretense 
that the People's Republlc or China did not 
exist. Even a.s we pretended It was not there, 
we Invested heavily In an elaborate systet_n 
of costly constraints to curtail that govern-
ment. 
The price or this detachment from reality 
was not trivial. Quite apart !rom billions 
spent tor counterpoises to China throughout 
Asl.a., our present Involvement In VIet Nam 
can be considered, In large measure, to be 
part of the price ot this constraint. So, too, 
was our earller Involvement In Korea.. 
These and other military actlons were un-
dertaken In the name ot a policy called 
"containment" which was based on a set ot 
assumptions about the nature of events 1n 
China, as we guessed or persuaded ourselves 
to be!1eve them to be. These asaumptlons 
were made In a. vacuum because of our Iso-
lation from the Chinese mainland. Not sur-
prlslngly, many or them turned out to be 
highly Inaccurate. 
The tragic cost of the miscalcule.tlons can 
be- stated In terms ·of the lives loot, the 
bodies maimed and the resources squandered 
all around the rlmlands of Asia, particularly 
In Korea. and Indochina. To be sure, we can-
not estimate what the alternative costs might 
have been had we acted on more accurate 
e.ssumptlons, or had we taken no action at 
an. Simply on the basis of what did happen, 
however, history may well record these :::nls-
C&lculatlons regarding China, as among the 
most costly of all time. 
I might say, parenthetically, that we 
a.re at a crucial point, at the present time, 
In determining whether we will persist In this 
mistaken course. I refer to e vents In VIet 
Na.m during the past few weeks. The new 
U.S. a.lr and sea actions are vestigial re-
sponses which arise !rom the old, not the 
new China policy which was signaled by the 
President's visit to Peking. Whatever the 
success of these new war measures, they wlll 
not alter In any way the overwhelming need 
of this nation to disengage completely from 
the Indochina conftlct. We need to do so, not 
to satisfy HanOI or Peking or Moscow, but 
In order to serve our own natlollftl Interests. 
It we have learned anything to date !rom this 
oontlict, It Is that we have no na.tl.onal stake 
In that conftlct except an end to further 
casualties and the return of the prisoners of 
war and th..e mlss.lng In action. The e<:>urse 
ot action best calculated to serve these na-
tional needs r em.a!nS to negotiate the best 
pol1tlcal solution without further recourse 
to arms and to get out of Indochina, lock, 
stock and barrel. 
But, to return to the central theme of my 
remarks, It Is revealing to a.sk ourselves how 
we became Involved In VIet Nam In the first 
place. How did we pennl.t ourselves to make 
such faulty commitments with such dis-
astrous consequences? We get some clues, I 
think, when we review the spectrum of our 
relationship with China. over the last two 
centuries. 
More than with other nations, our rela-
tionship with China has been subject to the 
ebb and flow o! popul&r myth. We have 
tended to oocUlate from tbe one oversimpli-
fied view of China to another. For almost 
two centuries, China has been viewed, alter-
nately, as benign or virulent, friendly or hos-
tile, wise or fool1sh. 
Like the "yin" and "yangu of Chinese cos-
mology which holds that life Is the product 
of a dualism of opposites, our Image of 
China h&s gone from one extreme to the 
other. On the one hand, there has been the 
l.ma.ge of the China of wlsdA:>m, lntell1gence, 
Industry, piety, stoic1sm and strength. That 
Is the benign China of Marco Polo and Pearl 
S. Buck; It Is the China of the Charl1e Chan 
movies and of the stories of heroic resistance 
to Japan In the 1930's. 
On the other hand, there h&S been the 
Image of the China of cruelty, barbarism, 
violence, and faceless hordes. This Is the 
China of drum-head trials, opium dens, 
bandits, summary executions, Fu Manchu, 
and the Boxer Rebellion. 
In the late 18th century, we looked up to 
China as an ancient clv111zaton-,superlor In 
many aspects of technology, cuLture, and 
social order and surrounded by an air of 
splendid and Imperial mystery. In tha.t pe-
riod, the China trade was sought eagerly by 
the Clipper ships and Chinese produce was 
hlgbly valued notably along the Eastern Sea-
board and 1n Europe. 
Respect turned to contempt, however, with 
China's quick defeat In the Opium War of 
1840. There followed acts of huml!1atlon of 
China. such as our pa.rtlclpa.tlon In extra-
territorial treaty rights and the Chinese Ex-
clu&on Act of the last half of the 19tb. 
century. 
In the early 20th century, attitudes shifted 
aga.ln to benevolence. American missionaries 
of many faiths made China a favored field 
for proselytizing and education. In this pe-
riod, the C,b.lnese became, for this nation, a. 
guided, guarded, a.nd a.<Iored people. 
Chinese resistance to the Japanese Inva-
sion In 1937 produced another shift from 
benevolence to admiration. At the end of 
the Second World War, admiration was dts.-
placed by disappointment and frustration, 
as the wartime truce between Nationalist and 
co=unlst forces collapsed In lnterlal strife. 
This nation becn.me profoundly disenchanted 
with China, a disenchantment which wa.s re-
placed abruptly In 1949 by hosttllty. U.S. Sec-
retaries of State turned their backs on Chi-
nese leaders and spoke of the menace of 
"Chinese hordes" as predecessors had spoken 
with slmUu revulsion of the "yellow perU." 
The hostll1ty wa.s largely a reaction, of 
course, to the coming to power of a Com-
munist regime on the Chinese mainland. We 
were not only dismayed by this development, 
we saw It almost a.s a. national affront. Peking 
was viewed a.s a treacherous extension of the 
Soviet steamroller which had reduced Eastern 
an d Central Europe to subservience at the 
end of World Wa.r II. Chins became In our 
eyes the Eastern puppet of world co=unlsm, 
to be manipulated by strings pulled In 
Moscow. 
After Chinese forces Intervened In the war 
In Korea. where, Incidentally, Mao Tse-tung 
lost his eldest son, U.S. policy was cast anew 
on the premise that the government on the 
Chinese mainland wa.s an aggressor. It was 
seen a.s ready to use force to Impose Inter-
national Communism anywhere In Asia. Con-
versely, It was assumed that 1! the endorse-
ment of the free natlooo were withheld, this 
regime which was said to be "allen" to the 
Chinese people would wither and collapse. 
On this premise, It was rationalized that 
recognition must not be extended to Peking. 
Instead, the omclal American view was that 
the Chinese National Government, Which had 
retreated to the Island of Talwa.n, continued 
to speak for a.ll or ChinA. We cut off trade 
with the Chinese malnla.nd and did whatever 
could be done to encourage other oountrles 
to follow sult. In a similar fashion, a diplo-
matic campaign was conducted year afteo' 
year a.ga4nst the seating of the Chinese Peo-
ple's Republic In the United Nations. 
We drew an arc of military alliances on 
the seaward side of China and undergirded 
them with the deployment of massive U.S. 
mUita.ry power In bases throughout the West-
ern Pacific. Tens of billions of dollars were 
expended In this process. Much of this lm-
meill!IB outpouring of etrort an<1 money seems 
Incredible now In the light of the President's 
recent vtsits to Peking and to Moscow. Yet, 
It has continued for 20 years and, of oourse, 
Is st111 going on, notably, In Indochina. 
As has been suggested, this last qua.rter 
century of China policy h&S been character-
Ized by delusion and miscalculation. We as-
sumed, tor example, that the Chinese Com-
munists would be unable to govern. We as-
sumed that the Peking government would 
be an extension of Soviet co=un!sm a.nd 
a w1lllng accomplice to Soviet purpose and 
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design. And we 88SUllled that the Chinese 
govern.ment would be bent on territorial ag-
grandizement. 
All ot these assumptions h.a.ve proved to 
be erroneous. In the first place, or the numer-
ous divisions which have arisen within the 
Communist world, the differences between 
Moscow and Peking have been the most slg-
nlftcant. They so remain today although the 
rasping edges ot the conntct appear some-
what tempered by the periodic fiare-ups or 
the war In VIet Nam. 
At the 9Bme time, the government or the 
People's Republic has not only survived, It 
ha.s provided the Chinese people with etrec-
ttve leadership. Chinese society has achieved 
a constaerable degree or economic, scientific 
and social progress. A modern technology bas 
been developed which Is sophisticated 
enough to turn out products ranging from 
· needles and hand-tools to thermonuclear de-
vices, earth satellltes and the rockets to place 
them in orbit. A powerful national momen-
tum has been generated which Is proving 
sumctent to supply an enormous-population 
with the wherewithal or decent surviv&J. and 
an Improving livelihood. 
Notwtthstanding assumptions to the con-
trary, the Chinese government has not shown 
any great eagerness to use Its own armed 
forces to spread Its control abroad. Where 
Chltl.EI6e armies have been employed they 
have been used to assert traditional terrt-
tortal claims, or In expression of concern for 
the safety ot China's borders. China has not 
become enmeshed In foreign mll!tary ad-
ventures. In V!.et Nam, tor example, the Chi-
nese mil1tary Involvement has been periph-
eral. There Is Chinese equipment 1n Sout h 
Vlet Nam but there are no Chinese battalions. 
In North Viet Nam reports have indicated 
the presence, trom time to time, not ot Chi-
nese combat units, but ot labor troops en-
gaged In repairing bomb damage to roads, 
ra1lroe.ds, bridges and the like. 
Chinese actions In Tibet. and along the 
Hlma.Jayan frontier with India, are often 
cited as examples or mllltant Communist 
aegress!on. Nevertheless, tor centuries, Tibet 
bas been universally regarded as falling with-
in China's over-all boundarles. It the Peking 
government claims that Tibet belongs to 
China, so, too, does the Chinese National Gov-
ernment on Taiwan. India also acknowledges 
such to bll the case and American pol!cy has 
never officially recognized Tibet as other than 
Chinese terri tory. 
Even in Korea, the direct Chinese mllltary 
Involvement did not begin untu United Na-
tions forces approached China'll borders. In 
any event, t-e last Chinese l)ata!Uons left 
North Korea years ago. 
Looking ahead, 1t would seem to me that 
Chinese energies and resources are ifO!ng to 
be 80 preempted by internal needs over the 
next two decades th8lt there Is l!ttle l!kel!-
bood that China could post a serious mUI-
tary danger to the Unlted States even 1! thlllt 
were the inclination. 
The evidence, in short, Is ample to dispel 
some o! the moat alarming assumptions on 
which our past policies have been based. Ot 
course, there Is an Immense potent1al danger 
1n China. There Is also an Immense poten-
tial danger in every other powerful nation in 
a world which has not yet learned how to 
maintain clv111zed survival in a nuClear age 
ex.cept on the razor'& edge. Insotar aa China 
Is concerned, the !undam.ental question tor 
ua Is not 80 much whether 1t Ia a danger, 
but whether our policies will act to alleviate 
or to exacerbate the danger. 
In my Judgment, these poUc!ea can allevi-
ate the danger only to the extent tll&t they 
are based on prem.tsea that correspond !hore 
nearly to reallt1ea than has been the case in 
the past. It will serve no Ulle!ul purpose to 
tlaU at win~. Now that we h.a.ve, 1n 1972., 
at last penetrated the ahroud ot obacur!ty: 
SIUTOundl~ China., there Ia reaaoa to hopa 
that our Judgments and actions regarding 
China and Asia, henceforth, wtn be better 
lntbrmed. 
In this new phase ot our relations with 
China, we must beware, or course, that the 
old pendulum or myth does not now swing 
to the other extreme, thereby creating a new 
!mage o! China which Is as unreal as the 
old. We must guard against becoming too 
enamoured o! the splendors ot a newly re-
vived amity. Banqv.ets and toasts and shark's 
fin soup do not ot themselves assure a new 
order of world affairs. -
To keep the pendulum In equilibrium In 
our current approach to China, It would be 
well to heed a rule laid down by Lord Palm-
erston, the prime Minister ot Great Br! tain 
In the 1860's, who declared: 
"We have no eternal allies, and we have 
no perpetual enemies .. . . " 
Our experiences 1n postwar World war II 
relations with Germany and Japan under-
score this observation. 
We have n.ot always been very astute about 
defining where our real Interests lle. We 
have otten tended to confuse them with 
tleetlng and transltory Images ot friend-
liness or anlmoslty. This Ia all too true In 
the case ot China where, tor 26 years, we 
have been obsessed with the assumed threat 
of a perpetual enemy. In tact, we might well 
have avoided the untold misery and loss ot 
life and re.sou.rces ot the per!pl'leral war In 
Indochina, h.a.d we forgone the prues of power 
and, Instead, taken a harder view or our na-
tional Interests. 
Whlle we cannot Identify national inter-
ests with exactitude, we do have It wtthlu our 
means to determine much more clearly where 
It Ia that they do not lle. The President has 
shown the way 1n this connection. Even 'be-
tore his vts!t to Peking, he had laid the 
groundwork. toe reestabllsh1ng more n ormal 
contact with the People's Republic o! China 
by the removal ot dlscr!m1natory restrict ions 
on tr~U"el of Americans to t,he Chinese main-
land and ~Y encl1Jl&. the embargo on trada 
with China. The embargo had been Imposed 
during the Korean War and. was ot a. dcslgn 
so tight as to exclude even chop-sticks. The 
tact Ill, however, th.a.t tor two decades, It 
had had no economic Impact 1n China and 
had served only to injure our own tradera. 
By ending the boycott on the eve of hia 
vllllt to Chin&, the PrealdA!nt removed what 
was, at most, an 1rrltant to China but which 
would have hampered hl.a e1forts to br1ni 
about the beg1nn1nga o! & reconclllatlon. 
A.a lt waa, President NI.Ion wae able to lay 
the groundwork tor the growth ot contact 
between the two natlona. The chances are 
good thr.t the months and years &head wW 
see a aractuai. increase 1n exchanges between 
China. and the United States !B m.ediclne and 
health, aclenca, joul'nallam, athletics, the arta 
and other pursuit&. 
An Increase In wade Is &loso to be antlcl-
p&tecl. The Cht.n.eee are 1n an excellent po-
sition to move forward in Ulls. cOilnect!on. 
It haa been their practice to keep lmporta 
and exporta, worldwide, loll rouel:J, be.J.ance. 
They have neither external nor lntern.al debt. 
They have amp~ exeh&xlae resenes. Thel.r 
International rep\ltr.tlon for Integrity and 
rellal).Utty 1n commercial tr&ns&t.l.ona Is al-
ready very good. A great range ot Chl.w!se 
products Is available for aale 1D the world 
marketa and tha Chlneae also hav.e a sub-
stantial shopping !1st for Imports which w1ll 
help to speed their own development and 
stren&then their economic self-reliance. 
El<Cbanges can take place, In my Judg-
ment, even though the Issue o! Taiwan's re-
malnB finally, to be resolved. · President 
Nixon. has o.ck.nowledge aa valid, Peking's 
clalrn that the lllland Ia part o! China. That 
claim., lncldental.l.y, Ia sustained by the Chi-
nese government on Taiwan. Wlth the as-
surance that the United States wm not 
pursue a two-China pol.lc.y, Peking Is pre-
pa.red to go ahead in reeetahllsh!.ng contact 
with this nation whUe exploring in Its own 
!ashton the road to reunlftcatlon ot the is-
land with the malnland. 
Beyond exchanges between China and the 
U'nlted States, there room larger questions 
or peace and security 1n the Western Pa-
clftc. Even as Wll meet here today, we await 
the consequences oi the latest esca.Ia.t!on 
ot the U.S. involvement in VIet Nam as well 
as the full Import o! the President 's discus-
sions in Moscow. One can only hope that 
we have seen the last resort to retaliation 
in Indochina, the !Ina! burst ot this wasting 
confl1ct and that progress can now be ex-
pected toward a genuine pol!tlcal settlement. 
In all candor, the recont of this tragic war 
provides l!ttle grounds tor optimism in this 
respect. The invasion of Cambodia dld not 
produce peace. Nor did the invMion of Laos. 
Nor- d!d the earlU!r bombing enterprises over 
North VIet Nam. 
Peace was the promise attached, in turn, to 
each of these escal!Utone of the U.S. involve-
ment. Each, In turn, led not to the promised 
peace but to more killed and maJ..m.ed. mOI'e · 
prlsoners o! wu, mon milllllng in action, 
more and more btwons 1n expenditures to 
produce more and more <levastatlon through-
out Indochina. 
The end ot th18 WM: b&s yet to come and 
It Is not clear yet when 1t w1ll come. we 
would do well, n.evertheless, to begin to ex-
amtne the posslbllltles ot a new security sys-
tem, based on the realities ot the 70's. These 
real.1tles urge us to-seek, 1n my judgment, an 
eqUU1brlum ot this nation's interesta with 
those ot China, Japan, the Soviet Union and 
the smaller nations of the Western Paclftc. 
All h.a.ve a stake 1n the peace ot the region. 
The restora.tlon of contact with China l:ur-
thers the posslb111ty that at some time tri-
partite discussions might be held between 
China, J&pan, and the United States, 1! not 
quadripartite talll:s, which would also Include 
the Soviet Union. A development ot this kind 
could do much to allay unfounded mutual 
fears and to b8j'1n to come to grips with 
the question of &d.justment ot v&Ud nailonal 
Interests. It could provide Insights Into such 
v!ta.l questtotlS as the 1ntent1ona ot the vart-
oua powers 1n the Western Pacltl.c and how 
they relate to one another, the economic 
needs or the Aalan nations, and the prcepects 
tcw curbing nuclear confilct. Most Important, 
such (l!scuss!ona m!gh~ provide a veh.!cle tor 
general stab111zat1on ot the Indochina penin-
sula and Southeaat Asia 1n the post-war era. 
Adjustments of thla lt1:nd rwquire tresh per-
spectives. We need to aee the situation as 
It Is today, no~ as It appeared 20 years ago 
1n the ea.taclyam.lc upheaval of the Chinese 
revolution. We need to see the s!tuatton not 
through the !QS' ot an old and stagnant hos-
tlllty but In the llgbt o! the enduring In-
terests ot the United States 1n the Western 
Pad1!.c which are DO !ellS than a peace ot 
equ&ltty and mutuality which wtil pernUt & 
fiowering ot relations witl:l all As!an nations. 
Nor, may I add, are they any more. 
I see great relevance In young men and 
women thtnk!ng deeply ot the tssues which 
divide China and the United States to de-
termine how they can be recast In new and 
uncluttered molds. Unltl!:e my generation, 
you have already learned much about Asia.. 
You have a greater awareness or Its Impor-
tance to thls nation and to the world. Fur-
thermore, you have not had the experience 
ot nst!onal trauma tn moving abruptly !rom 
an era marked by an almost !awning be-
nevolence toward China to one ot thorough 
disenchantment. You Wllre spared the !terce 
hoot111tles which rent this nation Internally, 
M a sense or wannth, sympathy, and secur-
Ity regarcl:!ng Chtna gave way to teertngs 
of revulsion, hat•ed a.nd l:naecurlty. 
You yotlllg Americans and your counter-
pacta In China will !1ve your adult years In 
an era in whtch much o! the world's history 
wiD be written ln the Pacific. What you do, 
how you relate to one another--Chinese and 
Jlmertcans--w1l! have much to do with 
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whether or not that history Is written In 
terms of peace and clviUzed human survlvo.l. 
I have seen China off and on since I servecf 
there In the Marines In the 1920's. I have 
seen you, your parents and your grand-
parents much closer up and for a much 
longer period of time. 
I am oon11dent about a future that belongs 
to your generation, both In China and In 
this country of ours. This Republ!c Is worthy 
of your best efforts not only In terms of 
developing Chinese and U.S. relations, but 
with regard to the entire world. You can do 
no more than try to achieve mut ual under-
standing and a peace with all peoples . You 
can and should do no less. 
CHINA : MYTHS AND REALrTIES 
WheneveT I talk with people of your age, 
I o.m struck by your candor and honesty. 
You raise questions as to the veJues of our 
ooclety, the Integrity at our publlc atralrs and 
the wl.sdom with which government Is being 
run. ThJa Is as 1t should be. Only through 
oonsta.nt reez:a.m.lnatlon wlli our poltcles a.nd 
our system be ahaped to meet the ever-chang-
Ing needs of the nation. 
TheTe Is a human tendency to cling to 
the ways of the P&Bt. It Is desirable In that 
It gives oontlm.ilty to our national l!fe. If 
carried too fa.r, however, It can be a straight-
Jacket. Persons In publlc 11fe, perha.ps, tend 
to be very susceptible to this tendency. Hence, 
the mistakes or lrrelevancloo of the P&Bt may 
be oveT-refieeted In curreJJJt pollcles. Un tU 
very recently, for example, your government's 
position on China seems to have been based 
largely on inadequate or erroneous 8.B8ump-
t1ons at what was going on Inside tha.t na-
tion of BOO mllilon. Now that the PresldelJJt 
has vlsited Peking, the fictions about China 
a.re falling away. We are beginning, a.t last, to 
see what really confronts us In the great 
nation on the otheT side of the globe. 
I would like to talk to you, therefore, about 
myths and realities rega.rding China. I do so 
be<:a.uce what happens In our relations with 
th..t nation will have profound meaning to 
you throughout your a.dult lives. A few weeks 
ago, I ha.d the expeT!ence of spending 16 days 
traveling In China. It wns not my first visit 
but It wa.s In 1946 that I ha.d last been there. 
So for a quarter at a century, that vast land 
has been to me as It has been to almost all 
Americans, as remote as the moon. In fact, 
s1noe tb,e spaoe progl'81Il began, we have spent 
more time and energy-<lJld much more of 
the federal treasury--thousands of times 
more-In attempting to fathom the moon's 
secrets than In trying to learn the truth 
about China. 
Since 1949, our concepts of China have 
~n compounded of Ignorance, half truth 
and untruth. This concoction produced a 
U.S. policy which was designed on the ball Is 
of a China seen as a malignant dragon 
hreathlng fire and lashing out aggressl vely at 
tbe world. 
Before most of you who are graduating 
were born, your government had already be-
gun to erect a Great Wall of Isolation against 
this presumed menace. A ring of military 
treaties was established In Asia to choke off 
what were thought to be China's Imperial 
ambitions. To nail these treaties Into place, 
moreover, U.S. bases were established all over 
that region. U.S. troops were sent to man the 
bases. Tens of bllllons of dollars In mUitary 
aid were distributed among foreign govern-
ments who did not have to do much more to 
obtain such aid than to give us assurances 
of their hostUity to Communism. 
While we were seeing China as a reckless, 
belligerent and powerful ally of Communist 
Russia, China was struggling to buUd on the 
rut.ru; ot World War n and a. great revolution, 
a political and economic system which would 
serve the needs ot the Chinese people. If we 
sought to contain China., In turn, the Chinese 
sought to keep us from Interfering In their 
atralrs. The Chinese view of U .a. policy 1n 
those days was that It was a logical extension 
of the over-all Western effort to dominate 
and exploit their country which had per-
sisted for 150 years. They saw us as Implaca-
ble enemies. 
It the Chinese did n ot read our Intentions 
correctly, we did not read theirs any more 
accurately. The fact Is that China did not 
engage In aggressive seizures of neighboring 
nations. Whatever territorial changes they 
have sought, with the Soviet Union, Burma 
and India, had also previously been those 
pursued by predecessor Chinese governments, 
not ably the government ot Chiang Kal-shek 
on Taiwan. 
In retrospeet, U.S. policy with regard to 
China. since 1949 has been 111-ln!ormed and 
misguided. I sa.y tha.t not a.s a Monday 
morning quarter-back. All of us who lived 
through those years share, to some degree, 
the wrl ting of this unfortunate chapter In 
U.S.-Chlnese relations. The fact Is that we 
let our !ears get the best of us. In looking 
o.t Chino. for the past two decades, we saw 
much that was not there. 
It Is stU! difficult even now to form Impres-
sions of China tree of these past distortions. 
Nevertheless, the distortions can be tempered 
by perspective In the sense that s. bottle can 
be judged as half full or as half empty. U 
Chlna Is measured by some of our common 
yardsticks, whether they be highway mlle-
age, the number of cars, telt>vlslon sets, 
k1 tchen gadgets, po:tttcal parties, or news-
paper editors--the bottle wlli be seen as half 
empty. If China. Is viewed In the light at its 
own past, the bOttle Is half full and rapidly 
IDling. 
That Is the way the Ohinese people look 
at thelr situation. They are not comparing 
their way of life with ours or with India's or 
even Taiwan's They are looking Inward at 
where they were yesterday, where they are 
today and where they wlli be tomorrow. It Is 
n o wonder, then, that there are ma.ny signs 
of popular acceptance of the new China and 
very little to Indicate pop,ular discontent. 
The fact Is that tile contrast of the new 
Ch ina wit h the old Is nothing short of ex-
traordinary. 
If the new China Is a closely controlled 
BOCiety, It is also true that political' freedom 
was not a. preemlnant characteristic of the 
old China. Yet, there are aharp contrasts be-
tween the old and the new. Unlike the past, 
the current political controls ha.ve resulted 
In a China free ot the ever-present threat 
of famine, pestUence, flood and other cala.m-
t.les. It Is a.lso a. China largely free of ex-
ploitation, free of political corruption and 
free of Indifferent government. 
By comparison with the past, there Is 
every vlsible lnd.lca.tlon that the Chinese 
people, todAy, live In a well-fed, a.dequately 
clothed a.nd housed, and roosona.bly healthy 
soolety. The cities a.re clean, orderly and 
safe. The shops are well stocked with food, 
clothing and modest consumer Items. Crime, 
begging, drug addiction, alcoholism, delin-
quency are conspicuous In their absence. 
Personal Integrity Is scrupulous to an ex-
treme. In Danton, for example, I saw a d.ls-
pmy co.se for 106t and found a.rtlcles In the 
lobby of the People's Hotel. It contained, 
among other things, a ha.l!-empty package of 
cigarettes a.nd a. peno111 
Today's China t.s an effectively organized, 
hard-working, early-to-bed, earty-to-rlse so-
ciety. In both urban and rural a.roos, the peo-
ple appear to be well motivated and coopera-
tive. Women and men work side by side for 
equal pay. There Is no visible distinction of 
rank on the farrns, In the factories, In the 
armed services or government otllces. A cas-
ual sense of freedom and mutual tolerance 
pervades personal relationships. There Is an 
air of easy egalltarlan!sm. There Is now bow-
Ing down or kowtowing, not even to the 
highest offi.clals 
The accent 1n China 1e on tode.y and to-
morrow, but a new Interest is alao evldence4 
In China's rich p881;. Everywhere there are 
striking restorations of cultural shrines 
even as the search continues for more of the 
ancient heritage. Excavations of the hJstoortc 
sites are underway throughout China a.nd 
the archeological finds, to d..te, have been 
very Impressive. 
Conservation of lllltural resources has a.lso 
received great emphasis. So ma.ny trees have 
been planted In a.nd around Peking, for ex-
ample, that the local weather has been al-
tered for the better, Throughout China a 
new produotlvtty is being developed by the 
reclamation of wastelands and by massive 
water control projects. 
Only a few years ago, no medical care to 
speak of was available to the great preponder-
ance of China's people. Now, along with regu-
lar physicians, so-called "barefoot" doctors 
who, In the tens of thousands, constitute a 
kind of basic civilian medical corps, are active 
In every region of China. The help which they 
give Is often based on a limited medical 
knowledge but It 1s sustained by an unlimited 
enthusiasm to serve the sick. 
Along with modern medicine, the Chinese 
are also using traditional herb treatment and 
accupuncture techniques. The latter Is a. 
Chinese healing practice which 1s over three 
thousand years old. It has been revived as a 
highly effective anathesta In surgery a.nd ts 
also being put to wtdesprea.d experimental 
use as a treatment for many aliments. 
Intestinal and other epidemic diseases-the 
terrors of old Chlna-ha ve been drastically 
reduced or eliminated. The heavy accent 
which has been placed on personal cleanliness 
and order has been a major factor In this 
achievement. In addition, there have been re-
peated mobilizations of the population In 
nui.ss campaigns to eradicate disease-carrying 
snails, IDes and mosqu!tes. Not only In health 
but In every aspect of society there is evi-
dence of a China being rebuUt. The Chinese 
people have swept away much of the Inequity, 
the Ineffectiveness and the despair of the 
past. 
Notwithstanding reports to the contrary, 
the famUy remains as the basic social unit of 
China. It Is a unit, h owever, which Is no 
longer perm! tted to function on the sole basis 
of tarnuy Interests, ind.llferent to the fate of 
the community and the nation. In short, the 
Chinese are fashioning a m odern society, with 
a way of life which Is rooted tn the past but 
meets the needs of the present, and seems to 
offer hope for the future. 
While theee vast changes have been taking 
place In China, we have gone on fighting a 
wa.r In Indocblna. Our Involvement In that 
wa.r Is derived In large part from the policies 
towards China which were adopted In 1949. 
As a former President put It some years ago: 
"Over this war (In Indochina), and all Asia. 
t.s another rellllty: The deepening shadow 
of Communist China.." To say It another way, 
we had engaged ourselves In Indochina, In 
ma.Jor part, to block a.n aggressive China. For 
all practical purposes, President Nixon no 
longer sees the situation that way. On his 
visit he found a Chillll not turned outward 
for aggressive ends but a China Intent on 
solving Its many Internal problems. He Ini-
tiated further contact on the basts of this 
f!ndlng. 
The fact 1s that the Chinese, themselves, 
reject the status of "super-power" and Insist 
that their system does not permit them to 
Impose their views on others by force. Their 
armed forces are maintained inside China's 
borders and there are no 'appeals for rnliltary 
crusades abroa4. They have no mU!tary out-
posts or bases in Korea, Southeast Asia. or 
anywhere else on the Asian continent. 
In a book written after a recent visit to 
China, Ross Terr!U summed up the Chinese 
view of the world In these words: 
"Here Is a superior people ... but whose 
sense of thelr superiority Is rooted In con-
tentment wtth their own mountains and 
rivers--not an active sense o! superiority 
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which pant. k> convert th& world to Its ezeel-
l&nce. A p&MlYe sense of eui;>erlorlty, wbl.ch 
basks, lnw&rd-turned., wlthtn Its own pos-
aesaed excei.lenca." 
There 18 little reason to expect a ra.d.1cal 
change in the baal.c direction of Chlna.'s pres-
ent course. Mao Tse-tung bas already be-
come a living legend In China and his writ-
ings are likely to Ill umln&to the path o! 
China's soclsl, polltlca.I, and economic de--
velopment !or the foreseeable !uutre. What 
Is to be antlclpa.ted, I believe Is more rapid 
progresa In buUdlng China's economy, with 
continued emphaSis on production. ChinA'S 
reeource3 are so diverse, its population so 
vast, and Its needs so great that the em-
pha.sla could continue to be pla.ced on ln-
terru>l development for ~ny years to come. 
I would anticipate that there will be an 
expe.nslon of contacts between Chin& a.nd. 
the reat of the world, Including the United. 
St&tel! So far as I can see, the steps taken 
thus far by th& President and the Chinese 
Premier to normal!2;e relations are lrre-
yemtble provldecl, I repeat, provtd<!a that 
this nation's courae out of VIet Nam 18 a.lllo 
Irreversible. Wtthout pea.ce in Indochina, 
~e Is little likelihood ol. a signlfl.cant &x-
pa.nslon of peaceful conta.ct with China. 
Aa for future relations- between the Cbl-
neee and ~el"t"es, I believe that we can 
d.lssol ..-e the fe&l"s of the pLSt by an honest 
exch&nge of viewpoints, mutual corusldera--
tlon, and decent restraints 1n dea.IIng with 
one another. The dUferences which exist and 
will continue to exist need. not lead to con-
jljct. On the contrary, they ca:n be adjusted 
to mutual gain. 
We are a young national culttue relative 
to China, hundreds o1 years comparee:! with 
thouean.ds ot years. There Is much to be 
I<mrned and ga.lned on both aides, in agri-
culture, lndnstry, pollution control, hea.Ith, 
education .u.d many other flelde. 
There ue human values to be examined 
.u.d weighed. The mutual educative process 
has begun a.n.ew. The procesa must be main-
tained on Ute be.&ls o! equaltty of treatment 
a.nd respect. The days or the one-sided rela-
tiQilllhip which once existed with China--
of tea.cber-pupU, master-servant, benefactor 
and dependell.~. and so on back Into th& 19th 
Century's "enlightened and heathen," a.re 
aone and It Is hard to oee who In contem-
porary China or In this nation will mourn 
t.ba1r passing. 
Chou En-1&1 D<O>ted that 1.t ha.d taken "100 
Je&n3 since the Optum Wam for the Cblneee 
people to stand up." Toda.y. they are standing 
up. Self-t:ellance Ia their wa~hwocd and on 
th.et buls they a.re buUdlng a new Cbln&. 
In the yea.rs ahead, you will &110 be bu1141ng, 
aa each generation does, a naw nation here 
lol:1 tha United States. I would hope that It 
wUl remain rooted In ~he soil of the past 
even aa 1t Ia redesigned for living ln. the 
present and. to provide hope a.nd conlldence 
!« the !utu.re. 
I regret to a.ay that the lega.cy which ha.s 
been le!t to you with regard to our relatlona 
wtth China contains a high percentage of 
distortion whlch, in turn, ba.s helped to dis-
tort relatlona with other parts o! the globe. 
It 18 no accldent, tor exampLe, that we have 
spent and are continuing to spend. the lives 
of tens of thousands of Americana in lndo-
chlna and tens of billions of dollars In that 
tca.glc con111ct. These aacrUkea a.re a part of 
the price o! two cl.ecadea of distortion In 
China pollcy and the sooner we !a.ce up to 
this underlying cause or the Indochina war 
tll.e better. 
You, who are not saddled with. th.a myths 
o! the past, can play a large role In clearini 
a.way this debris. On the heels of the Presi-
dent'& lnltlatlve, the reallty o! China 18 be-
gUmlng to trlclde Into the COliSC!ouanesa o! 
iO'~<ernmen.t. The en.Ilihtenmeut of your gen-
eration can speed. that process. r am contl• 
dent that you will not be fettered with the 
!ears ot ttle pat, that you wtl1' lool!:: at the 
wortd aroUJld: you with tr.h clarity and find 
~e- courage- to ihl.nlr. your own t.boughts. To 
think you.r own thoughta Is the well-oprlng 
of treedom. Ma.y you dn.w deeply on it to 
help shape a. better relatlonahJp between 
this nation and China. and with all natiOll& 
TOWARDS /L FoREIGM POLICY OF MUTUALITY 
I come here today to convey a word ot 
optimism regarding the na.tlon's foreign re-
lations. Optimism In this connection is long 
overdue; st111, I hope my reference to It 
at this time is not premature. Whatever the 
C&lle, my expectation is tha.t history may well 
record 1972 as the year In which a corner 
was turned for peace. There are indications 
that the world Is headed back to.....-ards con-
&tructll9"e hum.&n purpose in it& major in-
ternational relationships. A wa.ter-shed ap-
pears to ha.ve been reached after a qua.rter 
century of dangeroua dallying In the murky 
detour& of the Cold We.r. 
Insofar as the government o! this nation 
18 concerned, except in the case of Indo-
c!I1na, I believe the Preaident Is reSponding 
In a new fashion to International circum-
stances. He 18 projecting not as adversary 
but as conclllstor. In so doing, he 18 paying 
heed to the legitimate claims of a public 
sentiment grown lmpa.tlent with the words 
of peace, sung to the cadence of w-&r. 
So, I address a word of hope especla.Ily 
1o you men and women o! this graduat ing 
class. Your generation can take a gre&t det.l 
of credit for bringing t.bout this c!lange. Your 
ma.nJfest dlsencha.ntment with the foreign 
pollclea of the past and with the tragte 
travesty in ~be na.me of peace In Indochina 
hu been Impressed on Wallhington. You 
have underscored the point that government 
18 Itself governed., In the ft.nal &Q.alysls, by 
the depth and degree of publll! support 
which can be commanded CO!" It& policies. 
You have helped to inject balance into 
ol!lclal channels and, hopefully; to assun 
that government will nat 1100n a.gain tn-
cfulge In mesnlngleSB e.dventures abroad, 
Ia.rgely at the expense or young 11re. rr we 
Me, In fact, going through the- last VIet 
&m, If we ...-e, In fact, getting oat at last, 
a& I devoutly hope, you have done your 
&hare to that end. 
To be sure, the mlllenlnm h118' not yet 
a.rrtved. Dooml!da.y ml8slle. 1n the Uhltell 
84Jatel! point at <fooml!dl\y mil!lllles several 
thousand m.Uea and a few mtnutes away. We 
stili rraYe vast garrisons on the mainland of 
Southeast Asia. Pll!.nes are still engaged In 
raining terror out or the Indochina skies. 
l!bips sow the lnatrumente or destruction In 
the waters south of China. In<teec:f, the Sec-
retary o! Defense ha.s just told us that' the 
spread- or con1'1lct, by sea and air, once again 
into North VIet lfam-thls latest episode 
fn the con1ttnutng agony or the Ihdochlna 
War, wm coet the people of the nation an 
additional $6 billion this year, not to spe&lt 
of more Uvea, more prisoners-or-war, and 
more missing In &etlan. 
Nor shoUld we overlook, in any note of 
optimism, the soclai and economic overload 
Which arises at home from these and other 
wasting demands abroad; the capacities of 
t!le nation are greg;t but they are not un-
IIm1ted. The strain ot serving, tor a quarter-
of-a-century ss the wortds leading pollce-
Imm, banker, pioneer In space and what-not 
mows In the price' that are paid In every 
store In ttre nation. It shoW!!, too, In the 
neglect of ttle environment, In thl!l decay ot 
cities and In the rise ot crtme, cftug addiction 
sud other barometers or soct.al breakdown 
wtthln our society. 
Before we can speak of any real light at 
tlle end or the tunnel, we must face up to 
the Immediate problems of the transition 
:n-om the ererttona or war t<J tile worl!: of 
peace. That the l!.<fjttstmen~ can be diMcult 
and p61n!Ul ha.s been "brought h-ome to Ull" by 
ttle Presidents announcement tlrst the ADM 
stte- at Malmstrom wW become inoperative 
under the- te:rma of the Nlxon-Brezhnev 
treaty. ln this caee, 1111 In ma.ny others, we 
must flnd.~the federal government has an 
obllptlon to aaslst In fl.ndlng-<:onstructlve 
a.lternatlvea. 
These quall&:atlons aatde, however, the 
fa.ct Is that the world baa come a long d~ 
tance towards sllill ty and. order In the short 
space of a few montba. That Is why, In my 
judgment, the class of 1972 can look with 
some confl.denee to the future. There is a. 
ehance that the evil genies which have 
plagued us tor a quarter century can be put 
back securely In the bottle. 
Conalder what bas been a.chleved by the 
diplomacy of the past year. What comes to 
mind most vividly, of course, Is the Presi-
dent's just completed. journey to Moscow. 
The accords which were concluded there were 
highly significant in themselves. Yet, the 
most Important result of the Moecow sum-
mit may be round not In specific achieve-
mente. Rather. It ma.y emerge from the 
chan~ ot national attitude on both sldee 
which were reflected In the me-etings. 
The results of the Nlxon-Brezhnev talks 
Indicated. a clear accepta.nce of mutual self-
Interest as the basis tor the future relation-
ship between the Soviet Union and the Unit-
ed. States. We have not always been very 
prompt In the past to recognize national 
se!t-1nterest as a basis !or a policy of peace. 
To be sure, we have sometimes over-assumed 
a national interest, a.s in VIet Nam and on 
that basis, spent the lives or tens of thou-
sands of Americans and permitted. over $130 
bllnon dollars to be sucked up by the de-
structive sponge of that con!Uct. Now, after 
years of thiS deadly wastage we have at 
last discovered that our only va.IId national 
concern 18 to get back the prlsone:-s of war 
and the recoverable mi86lng 1n action. we 
have come at last to realize that our only 
nattona.I interest 18 to get out of the Indo-
china Involvement, lock, stock and barrel. 
U on some OCCMI<>ns we have ov&r-as-
sumed national Interests, on others, we 
ha.ve Ignored them almost as though they 
were not flttlng to a great power. So, we 
have he.sltated to define our bonds fide con-
cerns and pursued, Instead, the will o'the 
wisp o! Ideological conlllct. We have done 
so on the basis of such slogans as "Make 
the World Sate for Democracy," and most 
recently the "Battle for the Minds of Men" 
or the "Containment ot Communism." 
The pursuit o! ldeologlcal struggle has 
not Led us to any victories. Rather, 
It baa projected. us Into a hodge-podge 
or foreign a.Id, mill tary a.lllsnces and 
Into · overseaa propag11.nda. and other 
dulllous manipulative operations. The 
warm human concern ot Americans !or 
other people.s haa been distorted. by ideologl-
ca1 warfare and we have plunged, without 
warrant, Into th.a interna.I political and so-
clai affairs of other natJ.ons e verywhere In the 
world. For two decades this costly exercise 
has become a way of lite ror hundreds of 
t!lou.aa.nds of Americans, some of whom !lave 
8C&l'cely set foot In the United. States for 
ma.ny yoo.rs. I! there 1a a new light of hope, 
lt Ia In large part because this random fta.il-
lng appears to be corning to an end. In 
place of the cacophony o! the Cold War, the 
recent Moscow conference spoke softly of 
"Baslo Principles o! Mutual Relations be-
tween the Unitec:l States and the U.S.S.R." 
ln t~ prtnclplea, the two na;tons reeog-
n121ed t!Iat there 111 no fea.slble aruswer In a 
ntrelear age ~ the prospect ot mutU11l an-
nfhtlatton other than mutual callabora-
tlan. 
'l'!lt!r two powl!B han begtm, naw, to' move 
toward what l'Yes!dent Mxon has eaUeti a 
position of "nrntu.Ily e.greed restraf.Irt" In 
anna.mente. TO that end., a treaty hilS' been 
negotiated by Pnlslcfent Mxon to Ilmi& Ol!en-
111 nr antf ctet'enstve strategte m1ciear weapons 
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on both sldea. As I have already Indicated, 
this treaty has a special meaning for Mon-
tana because It Is expected that Malmstrom 
wlll not be developed now as an ABM site. In 
the circumstances, what I told the Senate In 
opposing the ABM program three years ago 
bears repeating teday. On AprU 1, 1969, I 
said: "If thl.s proposed ABM mlsslle sys-
tem ... Is right for the nation, It w111 be 
right for Montana. If It l.s wrong for the na-
tion, however, the location of one site at 
Malmstrom cannot make It right. 
"What economic benefit to a Montana com-
munity wlll equal the additional tax bur-
dena and the new Inflation which will weigh 
on all the people of Montana ... ? It the sys-
tem becomes an Insatiable maw for the con-
sumption of public resources, who will pay 
for the neglect of other urgent needs, If not 
all the people of the nation lncludlpg Mon-
tanans?" 
That was my position on the ABM three 
years ago. It remains my position. I will sup-
port the President in regard to the Nixon-
Brezhnev Treaty because I think it Is a step 
on the road to peace--a goal devoutly hoped 
for by all mankind. 
The diplomacy by which the treaty was 
negotiated is similar to that which led the 
Preslc1ent to take the first steps In breaking 
down the barriers of Isolation and separation 
with the People's Republlc of China. To di-
gress for a moment for a personal note, let me 
eay that on March 29, 1968, I gave the first 
lecture sponsored by the Mike and Maureen 
Me.natleld Foundation at the University. The 
subject was "China: Retrospect and Pros-
pect." My remarks, four years ago, contained 
this statement: · 
"It ought to be made unequivocal that we 
are prepared at all times to meet with Chi· 
nese representatives--formally or Informal-
ly-In order to consider differences between 
Chino. and the United States over VIet No.m 
or any other question of common concern." 
The President's vlstt to Peking early this 
year which was followed by the journey of 
the Senate Minority Leader and myself a 
few weeks ago, has now made unequivocal 
the readiness of this nation to meet with 
China to the end that dltllcultles may be 
dl.ssolved and civil contact restored between 
the two peoples. Four years Is a long time. 
It Is a long delay-but It Is a beginning. The 
Great Wall of separation has commenced to 
crumble and the way to a stable peace In 
Asia Is opening at last. 
What the President bas dope with regard 
to the Chinese People's Republic Is to remove 
a self-Imposed stra.Jght-jacket on the foreign 
policies of the nation. Following World War 
II, for example, rather than face the great 
upheaval which bad taken place In Chino., we 
chose l;lot to recognize but to quarantine lt. 
We cut ourselves of! from contact with these 
monumental changes, tblnklng all the wblle 
that by so doing we somehow could exercise 
political control over them. In retrospect, It Is 
clear that we bad little or no effect over the 
course of events. 
The fact l.s that there was a viable and In-
dependent government In control In China 
tor many years before we chose to acknowl-
edge that such wa.s the case. It avalled us 
nothing to Ignore and Isolate ourselves from 
that government. Yet, we continued to do so 
long after this pollcy bad lost the last shred 
of a rationale. · 
Now that myths have begun to be replaced 
by realities, we can proceed to explore with 
the People's Republic of China, as the Presi-
dent has started to do with the Soviet Union, 
the posslbllltles of mutual accommoc1o.tlon. 
The change comes very late. Already, as . I 
have Indicated, the economy of the nation r~ 
veals the stresses Imposed by unreall.stlc and 
excessively costly foreign-defense policies. 
Last year, for example, It was necessary to de-
value the dollo.r, to ral.se Import duties and 
to Impose domestic controls to prevent a. 
catastrophic breakdown In the nation's fi· 
nanclal grid. The process of adjustment had 
been delayed too long to make a graceful and 
painless transition and It wlll be prudent to 
anticipate still other shocks In the future. 
Nevertheless, we a.re now moving In the 
direction of mutualit y, of a sharing of re-
sponsibilities and leadership with other na-
tions. In part, this process depends on ne-
gotiations. In part, however, It Is possible 
to take unUatere.l actlono. It Is not always 
necessary to await the pleasure of others In 
order to lighten our self-Imposed burdens. 
I have, for example, not hesitated to urge 
unUateral action at various times with re-
gard to VIet Nam ln an effort to bring the 
Involvement to a more rapid conclusion. I 
have done so because the ending of this mis-
taken and tragic adventure l.s our problem 
and our problem alone. Every day that the 
Involvement persists adds to the burdens of 
the people of this nation, to the !1st o! dead 
and wounded and tc the devaste.tlon of the 
hapless people of Indochlno.. others may 
have an Interest ln our withdrawal from this 
oontllct. But none has a more vital Interest 
than this nation In getting out without de-
lay. 
I have also urged unUateral action to bring 
about a substantial reduction of U.S. forces 
ln Europe. There l.s no rhyme or reason, In 
my judgment, to keep more than half-mU-
llon U.S. military personnel and dependents 
In Western Europe a quarter of a century 
after World War II at the expense of the 
people of the United States. Whatever pur-
poses of foreign policy the U.S. garrison In 
Europe may stm serve, the same purposes 
can be met by a 'far smaller contingent. As 
It Is now, this enormous deployment Is a 
drain on U.S. revenues; It Is fuel for lntla-
tlon In the United Stat es and It 1.s a major 
source of the weakness of the dollar In re-
lation to the currencies of other nations. 
I have stressed this Issue time and a~ln 
against the resistance of the Executive 
Branch under the Administrations of three 
Presidents. Insofar as I am concerned, It wlll 
continue to be stressed, notwithstanding the 
Mpscow agreements which call for negotia-
tion of mutual and balanced reductions of 
forces In Europe. The fact Is that the Soviet 
Union does not pay for this antiquated and 
largely Irrelevant U.S. deployment. The Euro-
peans do not pay 'for lt. The people of this 
nation pay the cost In their taxes. I see no 
particular vlrlue In prolonged negotiations 
with the Russlsns tc bring about a reduc-
tlon .of U.S. forces which should have been 
done years ago ln our own Interest. I am ap-
palled to think of the billions which have 
already been wasted In this long waltlll£ 
game. 
There was a time within the clear remem-
brance of many of us here toc1ay, when the 
rhetoric of Cold War WSB part and parcel of 
policy. That was a time when there did not 
appear to be any mutuality of Interests be-
tween East and West and when it would have 
been futlle to urge unUatera.J steps to reduce 
tensions. Those were the days when each na-
tion was what George Washington so correct-
ly described as the "slave of Its own 
animosity." 
The essential fact In precipitating the Cold 
War was that two powerful new forces-Ideo-
logy and tecbnology-<:a.me together at the 
close of World War II. Tbl.s fusion vastly com-
plicated the whole Interplay of lnternatlona.J 
affairs. The technological problem was awe-
some In Its simplicity. With the great tlooc1 
of •c!entlfic and engineering advances, gov-
ernments came Into possession of the power 
of ln.stant and worldwide destruction. In oon-
sequence, the processes of statecraft W"'e 
compressed In time and aJ tered radically In 
conduct. . " 
In this cquDitry there WSB a eof:litttutlone.l 
fall-out from ~ 4ectlnologlcal develop-
ments. The power ot the Executive Branch 1n 
foreign alialrs lncreSBed drastically even aa 
the power ot the national legislature, the 
Congress and especially the Senate, shrank In 
proportion. In crises, so It was reasoned, there 
would not be time to make political deci-
sions, much less debate the Issues. At the 
same time, the new technology of war, by 
Its scope and complexity, became more than 
ever a partner of government, with a vested 
Interest In Its own perpetuity and a high po-
tential for distorting public decisions about 
war and peace. 
The other aspect of the Cold War-the 
ideological problem-arose from the fact that 
two of the vlctcrs In World War li-the So-
viet Union and the People's Republic of Chi-
na-were revolutionary states co=ttted to a 
system of social and economic organlza.tlon 
which was anathema to this nation. The con-
splratcrlal aspect of Conimunlsm posed a 
particularly painful problem for the United 
States, breeding suspicion, distrust and di-
vision In government. It became dltllcult to 
separate valid threa.ts to national security 
from the bombast of the power-seekers. En-
lightened public debate became constrained 
and as a result public policy WSB not always 
subjected as fully as It should have been 
to the purgative of critical challenge. So the 
political paroxysms of the '50's led to the 
rigid policies of the '60's. 
History may well record that we pursued 
the correct foreign policies Into the early 
1960's; that we bought time, through con-
tainment and counterforce, to permit the 
gradual moderation of Communist power, 
thereby reducing the Marxist states to the po-
litical dimensions of other nations. How-
ever that may be, It has been apparent for 
some time that we persisted In these policies 
too long. We were blind to changes elsewhere 
and to the posslblll ties of adjusting to mu-
tual Interest. In the end, we came to the 
disaster of VIet Nam. It Is part of the price 
which bas been exacted for the obstinate 
pursuit of the obsolete In foreign policy. 
How can It be prevented from happen-
Ing again? Quite possibly the world wlll not 
soon see a repetition of the partlcutlar con-
fluence of historical forces--Ideology and 
technology-which produced the rigidities 
of the Cold War. Possibly, the awareness of 
our own electcrate may now be such that 
prolonged p eriods of national self-delusion 
will no longer be countenanced. Perhaps, 
more effective techniques wlll be found In the 
art of government which wm act to limber 
the dead weight of massive bureaucracy and 
so bring about a greater responsiveness to 
changing circumstances both at home and 
a];!oard. Perhaps, the addition of the under-
21-voters to the electorate which I consider 
the highlight of my career-wlll revitalize 
the entire political process. In any event, It 
js doubtful that your generatlon~ared as It 
has been by the folly and outrage of VIet 
Nam-wllllong suffer ln silence a foreign pol-
Icy which Is based on the outdated. 
In the final analysis It comes down to the 
degree to which an enlightened and vigorous 
electorate wlll probe and test and call to 
account the' policies of Its own government. 
Pre.sldent Brewster of Yale has put It ln these 
words: 
"Exposure, questioning, reappraisal are 
often paln,ful, even agonizing; their price Is 
nothing, .however, compared to the resent-
ment ar<>Used by a feeling of manipulated 
lgnora,nce." 
Yo~· generation has some reason to feel, 
I'm sure, that it has paid the high price of 
"manipulated Ignorance." At least you 
have the advantage of knowing clearly what 
your generation must avoid. I am confident 
that you can and will not only skirt the pit-
falls of the past, but being thus spared the 
old burdens, you wlll be free to explore the 
vast posslbUitles of mutual accommoc1atlon 
with all peoples In a world which Is now be-
ginning to be liberated from Ita obsolete 
fears. 
You can do no more. You should do no 
less. 
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